# Citations for populism paper

1. **Introduction:**

* What is populism
* Populism in both countries (agrarian populism vs. political populism)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| p.1: populist movement: diffuse system  (Taggert) | “Populist movements have systems of belief which are diffuse, they are inherently difficult to control and organize, they lack consistency, and their activity waxes and wanes with a bewildering frequency. “ |
| (Taggert) | six key themes that run through populism:   1. Populist as hostile (Feinde) to representative politics 2. Populists identifying themselves with an idealized heartland within the community they favour 3. Populism as an ideology lacking core values 4. Populism as a powerful reaction to a sense of extreme crisis 5. Populism as containing fundamental dilemmas that make it self-limiting 6. Populism as a cameleon, adopting the colours of its environment |
| p.3: Eschewing (Meidend) complexity  (Taggert) | “Eschewing the complexity of representative politics, populists advocate simplicity and directness in their politics. The accoutrements of representative politics, including parties and parliament, are all too often, for populists, distractions and unnecessary complications.” |
| p.4: tries to translate into simplicity  (Taggert) | “Populism’s ambivalence about politics helps to explain why it is so often an episodic phenomenon. Eschewing the institutions, forms and patterns of representative politics, populism deliberately tries to translate the simplicity and plain talking of ordinary people into structures that are simple and direct.” |
| p.6: new/modern populism  (Taggert) | “And coming to Europe, the new populism of the far right becomes fundamentally urban and exclusionary” |
| p.14: industrialization  (Taggert) | “Gavin Kitching places populism at the centre of his analysis of thinking about development. He argues that populism is a reaction to industrialization and is characterized by a championing (verfechten) of small-scale production and opposed to concentration of production (Kitching, 1989: 19-22) 🡪 focuses on peasant ideologies |
| p.4: populist appearance. amateurish political behavior  (Mudde/Kaltwasser) | “A final approach considers populism predominantly as a folkloric style of politics, which leaders and parties employ to mobilize the masses.”  “In this understanding, populism alludes to amateurish and unprofessional political behavior that aims to maximize the media attention ad popular support.” |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| **Why Poland?** | “I argue that since the enlargement of European Union in 2004 in new member countries, they have been developing patterns of reactionary politics growing out of what I characterize as post-peasant populism.” **Juraj Buzalka (2008)** |
| **Why France??** |  |

**Political Parties**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| p. 757:  political parties in Poland  (maybe put a left right scale as image?)  (Buzallka) | 1. **Catholic-conservative** - Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice) = Pis 2. **2 nationalist-populist parties**, Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Self-defence of the Polish Republic) and Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) 3. **conservative-liberal** Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) 4. **strong agrarian basis and deep roots in south east Poland** Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peaople’s Party): 5. **political left:** Lewica I Demokraci (Left and Democrats) |
| p.500  PiS = populist  explanation why  (K. Jasiewicz) | “even more importantly, PiS drew to the polls almost two million of new voters. The message sent by the PiS—be it its anti-communism, its euro-skepticism, its law-and-order appeal, or, in short, its populism—still resonates well with substantial segments of Polish society.” |
| Political parties in France  p.306 (Aurielien Mondon) | the extreme-right electorate appeared to have abandoned the ‘copy’ and moved back to the ‘original’, as many within the extreme- right party had predicted  (Le Pen and Doucet 2010; Lemarie´2011).  copy = UMP, FN = original |
| p.1  Le Pen/ FN and its goals  (Roger Cohen) | **“**she says she will take France out of the euro, the shared European currency, and restore the franc. Exit from the European Union could follow. This would constitute an economic and political rupture ” |
| p.3  FN has exploited the loss  (Cohen) | “This sense of dispossession, of loss, is what the National Front has exploited: loss of identity, jobs, national borders; loss of faith in a corrupt political system.” |
| p.305  (Mondon) | “but gave every French person permission to express their prejudice (eth Thenic, religious, racial or even gender) in whatever manner they chose, for all they defended was their love of France.” |

1. **Theory:**

* Testing the data on these topics …

1. Descriptive:
   1. Gender
   2. Age
   3. Education
2. Political component:
   1. Political interest
   2. Trust in the legal system
   3. Satisfied with democracy
3. Values/ Social interests:
   1. Migrants make country better = Xenophobia
   2. Islamophobia
   3. Anti-Semitism
   4. Traditions
   5. Religiousness

**Descriptive:**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Gender:** |  |
| p.178  age and gender  (Brigitte Beauzamy) | Falter looked for explanations of the RRP vote in the Federal Republic of Germany - factors: gender (women vote less for populist party), age (these parties appeal mostly to youth and older people). |
| **Age:** |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| **Education:** |  |
| p.10: common people are being excluded  🡪 unemployment!  and level of education  (Mudde/Kaltwasser ) | “[…] the notion of “the common people” vindicates the dignity and knowledge of groups who objectively or subjectively are being excluded from power due to their sociocultural and socioeconomic status.” |
| p.27  Bildung  (Lucardie) | Diplomlose unterschichtenhalten fest an Traditionen, an ihrer Muttersprache und an der einheimischen Kultur |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

**Political component:**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Political interest** |  |
|  |  |
| **Trust in the legal system** |  |
| p.11: critique against establishment  (Mudde/ Kaltwasser) | ”[…] but it tries to mobilize this majority against a defines enemy (e.g. “the establishment”). This anti-elitist impetus goes together with a critique of institutions such as political parties, big organizations, and bureaucracies, which are accused of distorting the “truthful” links between populist leaders and “the common people” |
| p.11: detest the elite  (Mudde/Kaltwasser) | Most populists not only detest the political establishment, but they also critique the economic elite, the cultural elite, and the media elite. All of those are portrayed as one homogenous corrupt group that works against the “general will” of the people.” |
| **Satisfied with democracy** |  |
| p.58  (Fomina and Jaeck Kucharczyk  ) | “Populism may be broadly defined as “a general protest against the checks and balances introduced to prevent ‘the people’s’ direct rule.” “  **Citation in Citation !!! 2**  **1. Pippa Norris, “It’s Not Just Trump: Authoritarian Populism Is Rising Across the West; Here’s Why,” Washington Post, Monkey Cage blog, 11 March 2016.** |
|  |  |

**Values/ Social interests:**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Xenophobia** |  |
| p.21  Xeneophobia  (Lucardie) | „Populisten brauchen – so behaupten etwa Daniele Albertazzi und Duncan McDonnell, aber auch Paul Taggert – outgroups (meist Immigranten), die als Sündenbock dienen und gegen die sie das Volk mobilisieren können, ohne die Eliten immer direkt angreifen zu müssen.“ |
| p.305  (Mondon) | “but gave every French person permission to express their prejudice (ethnic, religious, racial or even gender) in whatever manner they chose, for all they defended was their love of France.” |
| p.179  socio-economic classes  (Brigitte Beauzamy) | He (Bonnetain, 2004) concludes that socio-economic factors, such as unemployment, have a significant impact on the FN vote. |
| p.179  Xenophobic  (Brigitte Beauzamy) | from previous research done on voting electorate :  “the electorate of the Front National appear much more xenophobic than the average voters (70)”.  (Bréchon and Mitra (1992: 68)) |
| p.308  FN = Anti-Muslim  (Mondon) | “As the election drew closer, Le Pen made it increasingly clear that she was targeting the Muslim population, and that her republican and secularist stance was little more than a facade (Mondon 2013a, 91–92).” |
| p.309  Islamophobe  (Mondon) | “she placed under suspicion all the asylum-seekers trying to reach Europe by sea but also anyone with a Muslim background” |
| **Anti-Semitism** |  |
| inner/ outer group |  |
| p.4  from antisemitism to nationalism  (Cohen) | “party by shedding its Fascist, anti­Semitic antecedents (Jean­Marie Le Pen, Marine’s father, called the Holocaust “a detail” of history) and replacing it with France­first economic nationalism” |
| p.680  from father to daughter – FN change after Le Pen – Le Pen Change  (**Michelle Hale Williams**) | “However, in 2011, with the first party leadership transition passing the torch from father to daughter, national attention has turned to the FN once again. Marine Le Pen appears to be repositioning and refocusing the FN.” |
| p.680 | party has been developed to a new breed/ brand |
| **Traditions** |  |
| p.27  Traditionalism <> Modernity  (Lucardie) | „Modernität bedeutet ständige Veränderung – technologisch, ökonomisch und kulturell. Diese Veränderung bringt Spannungen und Frustration mit sich.“ |
| p.28 – 29  Wähler pop. Parteien: eher traditionell  (Lucardie) | Theorie besagt, dass Wähler populistischer Parteien mehr traditionelle, weniger post moderne werte hegen: stehen der mutikulturellen + globalisierten Gesellschaft kritisch gegenüber. (Zitat: E. Ivarsflaten: What Unites Right-Wing populists in Western Europe(2007)) |
| p.759:  church and politics  (Buzalka) | “Roman Catholic Church was one of the few threads of continuity in Poland's past and it was always part of the world of Polish politics” (citation of (Davies 2005, p.) |
| p.215: Agrarian populism  (Mudde – in the name of peasantry) | “Strive for the preservation of small family farms by founding co-operatives, for strengthening (rural) communities, and self-governance” (Piccone and Ulmen 1995) |
| p.760  (Buzalka) | 🡪 traditional culture is enforced, central importance of family farm , supporting peasant |
| p.761  agrarian traditions  (Buzalka) | Memories of the peasant past are transmitted across generations, from peasant grandparents to their grandchildren, some of then university educated. ed. This type of memory is observable in everyday life, in people's worldviews as expressed in narratives that nourish a kind of peasant nostalgia. |
| p.761  traditions  (Buzalka) | peasant world + religious world still has power to influence political positions through traditions = driving forces of populism  (together with structurally positioned power relations) |
| p.762  (Buzalka) | Many religious leaders + populists share the safeguarding of traditions, fear the loss of traditional character of people, their national identity and their pre-industrial moral purity |
| **Religiousness** |  |
| p.759  traditions and religion  (Buzalka) | “past, invented a new and seemingly internationalist ideology based on an alliance between workers and farmer.” 🡪 strengthened the peasant imaginary in Poland (traditions)- folklore Religion connects everyone in Poland |
| p.759  church and religion) | Catholic Chruch opposing the communist regime until 1989, significantly influenced the new moral order afterwards |
| p.762  (Buzalka) | because the church also fear the loss of traditions in Eastern Europe, populism legitimates itself through an alliance with it,  🡪 many religious leaders support populists because for their care of traditions |
| p.491  religion  (K. Jasiewicz) | “the best predictor of voting behavior is one’s religiosity” |
| p.495  religiousity  (K. Jasiewicz) | “the more religious people were (which can be measured either by self-assessment or by frequency of participation in religious services), the more likely they were to display euro-skeptical attitudes (Jasiewicz 2004).” |
|  |  |

1. **Data:**

* ESS Data Used – why did i choose these parties
* Models (why did I choose these models?)
  + Logistic Regression
  + Maximum Likelihood
* Results

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

1. **Conclusion:**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| p.4  from antisemitism to nationalism  (Cohen) | “party by shedding its Fascist, anti­Semitic antecedents (Jean­Marie Le Pen, Marine’s father, called the Holocaust “a detail” of history) and replacing it with France­first economic nationalism” |
| p.304  crisis has always been a central theme  (Mondon) | “Crisis has always been a central theme to the extreme right (Mudde 2007, 205–210; Taggart 2000), and played a key part in FN campaigns.” |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |